789

Under Secretary Armacost

Current
Policy
No. 789

Promoting Positive Change in Southern Africa

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

HEWARE PUBLIC LIBRARY
APR
U.S. GO... DOC.
DEPOSITORY 376

Following is an address by Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, before a convocation at Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota, January 24, 1986.

Coming to Carleton is like coming home. It has been nearly 30 years since I was last in this chapel. In those days we were required to attend convocations. Children of the 1950s, it did not occur to us to protest. We heard some interesting people speak, and I have no regrets.

I hope the topic of my remarks this morning will be of interest to you. In Washington, we are concerned about southern Africa at all times, but with Congress back, U.S. policy toward southern Africa has again been pushed to the forefront of our consciousness. The subject grips all Americans. The turmoil in South Africa's black townships and the familiar features of racial conflict and brutality—tear gas, rubber bullets, armored cars, dramatic funeral scenes—are regular features on the nightly news.

Beyond the violence, South Africa has captured attention for other reasons. In 1984, the black South African bishop, Desmond Tutu, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his leadership in the nonviolent struggle against apartheid. South Africa has become an issue in the Congress and a matter of concern for a public wanting to make their voices heard against apartheid. Institutions around the country, including colleges like Carleton, are being challenged to reconsider investment policy.

U.S. Objectives in Southern Africa

For all these reasons, I welcome the chance to share some thoughts on a central question we are all asking: what can the United States do to promote peace, stability, and social justice in southern Africa?

I speak not only of apartheid and our desire to see peaceful political change in South Africa but also of our efforts to promote regional peace in southern Africa. Our objectives are clear: the independence of Namibia; the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola; and an end to the cross-border violence that has compounded the hardships of the people throughout the region.

The word "interdependence" might well have been coined to describe southern Africa. Countries in the region are linked by geography, history, economics, and transportation and communications networks. What happens in one country in southern Africa swiftly affects its neighbors.

For this reason, let me put our concerns in South Africa in perspective by starting with the broader regional picture.

Promoting Namibian Independence

A key objective of American diplomacy is independence for Namibia. Namibia is Africa's last colony. It cries out to be free, and the entire world community agrees. We are ready to do our part. For a number of years, we have been in the forefront of diplomatic efforts to implement UN Security Council Resolution 435, which defines how the transition to Namibian independence under UN supervision should occur.

We have coordinated our efforts with those of the front-line black states of southern Africa, SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization], and other Namibian political entities, as well as with the South African Government. But all of us must face facts. Namibia will not be free unless South Africa, which has occupied it for 70 years and considers the territory important to its national security, agrees to implement UN Resolution 435. Our diplomacy over the past 5 years has, therefore, concentrated on developing a regional consensus that will reconcile the varying interests involved.

Eliminating Foreign Troops From Angola

The situation in southern Africa—and, thus, the achievement of Namibian independence—was enormously complicated 10 years ago when the Soviet Union introduced a Cuban proxy army into Angola. That army, now 30,000 men strong, is a threat to the security of all the nations of the region.

Africa was for years a continent happily insulated from the East-West military competition. The presence of Cuban troops has destabilized Angola and com-

S1.71/4:

READEX
FICHE

pounded the difficulty of resolving Angola's civil war. It extended Soviet power into the region. It thereby challenges our own strategic interests; it establishes an unfortunate precedent. The Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola was the first in a series of Soviet moves in the Third World in the late 1970s. Angola was followed by Soviet interventions in Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Afghanistan—events which helped undermine East-West relations and arms control during that decade.

So, we seek an end to the Cuban military presence in Angola. We have succeeded in securing South African agreement that if the Cuban problem in Angola can be resolved, South Africa will agree to carry out international agreements for Namibia's independence. We have similarly brought the Angolan Government to agree to the principle of Cuban withdrawal. We are now seeking agreement from both on the timing of these reciprocal moves. Agreement will mean an end to Cuba's destabilizing presence in Angola and South Africa's threats to Angola's security and will help promote independence for Namibia—worthy objectives.

Even though we do not maintain formal diplomatic relations with the Government of Angola, we have met regularly with Angolan representatives to pursue a settlement. The most recent meeting took place in Luanda on January 8 when Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs] Chester Crocker held talks with Angolan leaders.

But agreement on Namibia will not, by itself, bring an end to Angola's problems. The Angolan civil war is a reality. For more than a decade, the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] government in Luanda and its Soviet and Cuban allies have faced a determined and dedicated indigenous opposition to Marxist rule. UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] freedom fighters led by Dr. Jonas Savimbi have carried their resistance movement across Angola, despite opposition from massive infusions of Soviet weaponry and Cuban assistance.

We believe, however, that there is no military solution to the Angolan civil war at this point in history. Peace can be achieved only through reconciliation among the opposing parties. This is a job for Angolans, but it cannot be accomplished so long as Angolan territory is occupied by a foreign army.

We have long recognized Dr. Savimbi's struggle, which is being waged against increasingly heavy odds. We have maintained contact with UNITA and have recognized the legitimacy of its struggle. Dr. Savimbi will visit the United States soon. During this visit, we intend to discuss with him how the United States can help advance the process of reconciliation and Angola's best interests in the period ahead.

Reducing Cross-Border Violence

Across southern Africa the flames of violence are seen. We are determined to do what we can to diminish and end violence between South Africa and its neighbors. We consider it equally unacceptable for guerrilla forces to carry out acts of terror across the region's borders into South Africa as for South Africa to launch military actions into neighboring states. We have urged South Africa and its neighbors to exhibit restraint and to supplant force with dialogue.

The results of these efforts have been mixed. With the signing of the Nkomati accord in 1984, Mozambique and South Africa agreed to stop supporting antigovernment elements operating in the other's country. This was a positive step in the direction of their curtailing cross-border violence and resolving their differences through diplomatic means. We also have devoted attention to reducing tensions between Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Botswana on the one hand and South Africa on the other.

But these accords are clearly fragile. They have been violated not infrequently. With tensions growing in South Africa, fresh challenges to the peace are occurring daily. South Africa's attack into Botswana last summer set our own peacemaking efforts back and forced us to recall our Ambassador from Pretoria. Violence along Lesotho's and Zimbabwe's borders in recent weeks poses new challenges to regional stability.

Engaging South Africa

Even as we have sought diplomatic and peaceful solutions to regional conflicts among the countries of southern Africa, we have advocated peaceful change and reconciliation among the communities of South Africa itself.

American policy toward South Africa has been much maligned—and much misunderstood. It is taken to describe exclusively government-to-government relations.

But that is wrong. Our policy is to establish a positive dialogue with all elements of South Africa—its government and its people of all races. And, beyond that, we encourage American organizations, corporations, enterprises, and institutions of all kinds to engage themselves with counterpart groups in South Africa. I believe we have something to offer one another across a broad front of relationships, and that's the job we are seeking to tackle.

As you know, this is a daunting task. Our influence—not insignificant—is still limited. We possess no magic formula for setting aright past and current injustices in South Africa. We start, however, from the premise that a blueprint for greater racial justice and harmony can only emerge out of political dialogue and negotiations between the South African authorities and the authentic leaders of its black community. We shall continue to press for the initiation of such a dialogue.

For us, the question in South Africa is not *whether* we should strive to end apartheid. That is a given. Apartheid is morally wrong. It is contrary to our most basic principles. It violates our sense of fair play. Apartheid must end. And its end, I believe, is inevitable. The practical and ethical question we face is *how* we can be most effective in speeding its demise and promoting the evolution of a more just society in South Africa.

Nor is there any question that we must encourage an end to violence. Here I speak not only of repression by the authorities but also vicious acts by blacks against other blacks. I cannot see any American Administration welcoming violent upheaval or extremist solutions. The only course consistent with American values is for us to be a champion of political solutions, negotiation, and peaceful change toward a more just system.

Some insist that we treat South Africa as a pariah; just as others urge us not to deal with Marxist governments in Angola or Mozambique. But acceptance of such counsel would allow little scope for diplomacy. It would encourage our global adversaries to exploit instability, racial injustice, and violence as a means to expand their influence in the region. It would obviously limit our ability to exert a constructive influence on all the parties.

The nations of southern Africa, moreover, have no desire to see us disengage. They desire our involvement. More than any other nation, we enjoy the confidence of all the parties. This enables us to act as mediator and honest broker. It requires difficult decisions as we try to guarantee that the policy means we employ contribute to the policy ends we seek. And this brings me to the issue of economic sanctions.

A Growing Economy as a Force for Change

Many ask why the Reagan Administration has generally resisted punitive economic sanctions on South Africa. Let me tackle this question head-on.

First, South Africa is the economic giant of southern Africa. What happens there is important to neighboring countries which depend on South Africa for much of their food and industrial products, send thousands of laborers into South Africa to work in its mines and industries, and rely on South Africa's well-developed port and transportation network to export their products. Economic hardship within South Africa would impose even greater economic hardship on all the black states of the region. Nor is it possible for the United States or its allies to replace what the South African economy provides. We cannot furnish the capital, the markets, the transportation, the services, and the technology which the region so desperately needs.

Second, since the main impetus for change in South Africa is internal—and I would argue that it is—the greatest enemy of apartheid is a modernizing economy and an expanding work force which need skilled labor, regardless of skin color. It is these realities that have prompted the South African authorities in recent years to increase investment in the education of blacks, encouraged them to countenance the formation of black labor unions, and gradually led them virtually to eliminate apartheid in the work place by lifting restrictions which excluded blacks from some jobs.

Economic growth does not inevitably bring political liberalization. But it can, and in South Africa it has accelerated the pace of change in a constructive direction. To damage that economy would not only blunt economic growth but also complicate the situation for a whole generation of South African young people, perhaps increasing unemployment and despair. Many young black South Africans are already educated, politicized, and unemployed—an explosive combination. Indeed, we sense that 3 years of economic recession within South Africa has exacerbated frustration and bitterness under apartheid.

I would repeat, therefore, that a vibrant South African economy can be a force for change. In a rapidly growing economy, it is increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for the races to continue to be separated under apartheid. Evidence of this is the shortage today in South Africa of an estimated 100,000 skilled workers. If there is any hope for peaceful political change, it almost certainly depends on a climate of continuing economic well-being.

Thus, U.S. policy has opposed punitive sanctions aimed at destabilizing the economy. Other Western allies have come to similar conclusions and have kept pressure on the South African Government but avoided sanctions which would only add to suffering, not contribute to a solution.

President Reagan's Executive Order

In this regard, the Executive order President Reagan issued on September 9, 1985, was not designed to injure South Africa's economy or harm individual South Africans. Its aim was to apply specially targeted sanctions as a clear signal to the South African Government of U.S. dissatisfaction with the pace of reform. To that extent, it reflected growing sentiment within the United States that stronger actions were required. The President acted to help defuse the climate of polarization and violence inside South Africa. But he refused to order punitive sanctions that would destabilize the economy and penalize black South Africans as well as the surrounding black nations.

The Executive order reflected our commitment to maintain a strong presence in South Africa and encourage American companies to be forces for change there. It also increased U.S. Government funds for scholarships and human rights activities. It banned bank loans to the South African Government in most cases; computer sales to apartheid-enforcing agencies and security forces; nuclear commerce; and the purchase of South African arms. Its proposed ban on the sale of Krugerrands within the United States has now been implemented.

On December 19, 1985, Secretary Shultz announced that 12 distinguished Americans would serve on the Advisory Committee on South Africa. During the coming months, this Advisory Committee, cochaired by Bill Coleman[1] and Frank Cary[2], will review with us South African and U.S. policies and provide Secretary Shultz with their recommendations.

[1]William T. Coleman, Jr., former Secretary of Transportation and senior partner with the law firm of O'Melveny and Myers.

[2]Frank P. Carey, former chairman of the board and chief executive officer of IBM.

I would repeat: most of our Western allies have adopted a similar, careful approach in dealing with the problems of the region.

Arguments Against Disinvestment

Paralleling the argument that the U.S. Government should impose economic sanctions on South Africa is the suggestion that American institutions should disinvest from U.S. corporations in South Africa. For the same reasons that I think blanket economic sanctions in South Africa would be counterproductive, I do not think blanket disinvestment would bring a beneficial result.

Indeed, rather than disengage from South Africa and the region, the United States should be seeking even more ways to make a positive difference. And here we need to distinguish between decisions made by the U.S. Government and those made by private entities such as this college.

Contrary to conventional wisdom in some circles, U.S. business firms do not dominate the South African economy. Although 300 U.S. firms operate in South Africa, American direct investment there is worth less than $2 billion. Ninety percent of investment in South Africa comes from South Africa's own capital. The United States accounts for less than one-fifth of the 10% derived from foreign sources. Consequently, U.S. investment hardly provides the kind of leverage that could, by itself, bring apartheid to an end.

Second, even if American firms pulled up stakes and left South Africa, little would change so long as there were British, German, Japanese, or, more than likely, South African companies willing and able to produce what American enterprises now produce. When companies decide to remove themselves, they send their personnel and their capital home: the plant and equipment stay—frequently to be snapped up at bargain basement prices by someone else. Gone as well could be the commitment to racial equality that many American firms have implemented in their operations and employment practices in South Africa. Gone will be the substantial investment U.S. companies have made—over $100 million in the last several years—for educating and otherwise improving the lives of their black South African workers. Experience has shown that once a company leaves, the decision is likely to be permanent. But the effects are not necessarily those intended.

A case in point is Motorola, which operated in South Africa for 21 years. When the company decided to close its operations in 1985, its plant and equipment were purchased by a South African company which today is turning out products not unlike those produced by Motorola. Whether the lives of black workers in that firm have been affected or not, we do not know. But I think the question is worth asking.

U.S. firms play a constructive role in South Africa. In 1977, Reverend Leon Sullivan, a civil rights leader from Philadelphia, investigated conditions at General Motors Corporation (GM) in South Africa. Reverend Sullivan was the first black board member at GM. As a result of his investigation, he determined that U.S. firms could marshal the resources of American companies for change by adopting a set of standards now known as the Sullivan principles.

A Role for the Sullivan Principles

The Sullivan principles call for equal pay for equal work, a fair minimum wage, increasing numbers of disadvantaged South Africans in administrative and managerial positions, and fair labor practices, including the right to form and join labor unions.

Additional principles include the desegregation of all eating, comfort, locker room, and work facilities; the improvement of quality of life for workers outside the workplace through subsidies to housing, recreation, health, and educational programs; and the establishment of training programs to prepare nonwhites for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs.

The Sullivan principles have been broadened and expanded over the years. In 1977, 12 U.S. companies had adopted the Sullivan principles. Today, 192 companies—a majority of all U.S. firms in South Africa—subscribe to them. American firms have shown the way for other companies operating in that country.

Reverend Sullivan himself says:

> It must be argued that the Principles have had some influence favoring political change, and that they will continue to do so. Help a person gain economic rights and you will foster gains in his political rights. Equality at the workplace and massive education programs for black and non-white workers ultimately will affect every aspect of their lives, public and private.... Simply put, the evidence reveals that the Principles are a conduit from the workplace through which the workers learn to address broader societal issues, including political rights....

I agree with this. I deeply believe that our Sullivan companies make a difference in South Africa and should be encouraged to carry on. Our collective ability to influence change will be diminished if they are pressed to leave. We need more creative interventions in South Africa, and the Sullivan companies are among the best vehicles we have for promoting that kind of change. I would urge the trustees, faculty, and students at Carleton to take these considerations into account as you decide college policy on this important issue.

Encouraging Dialogue

Today, moreover, American businessmen have joined South African companies in calling on the government there to sit down and negotiate with legitimate black leaders.

This dialogue is not easy when the policies of the South African Government for the past 38 years have prevented it. Suspicion and mistrust abound. Black and white South Africans tend to look at their country and see two conflicting pictures. For one group, the glass is half full; for the other, it is more than half empty.

White South Africans constantly emphasize how much change has taken place in recent years. Some private schools have been desegregated; some sports teams have been integrated; the so-called immorality and mixed-marriages legislation has been abolished; job reservation which fenced off certain jobs for whites only has been scrapped; some theaters, restaurants, and hotels have been desegregated; nonwhites have been allowed for the first time to sit in Parliament; black unions have been legalized; investment in the education of blacks has been expanded.

To white South Africans these changes appear rapid, even revolutionary. In some, such change inspires fear; among others, it provokes resistance. To still others, the changes offer the premise and the possibility that a more just society can be achieved through peaceful means.

Quite clearly, black South Africans looking at the same events view the process through different eyes and see a different set of realities. Such changes as have taken place to them appear marginal and grudging; invariably, they have occurred without the black community being consulted. There has been little dialogue. Whatever other concessions have been made, blacks still lack citizenship; they still cannot vote. They still must carry on their person the hated passbooks. Black contract laborers still must leave their wives and families behind in the homelands when working in the 87% of South Africa that is reserved for whites. This is a time of rising expectations on the part of blacks in South Africa. It is not surprising that positions have been polarized by the nearly 2 years of violence during which more than 1,000 lives have been lost.

Radicalization makes it harder and harder for blacks committed to negotiation to maintain their credibility, to take risks, and to enter into dialogue. This is a time for statesmanship, not only among white leaders but also among black leaders if the peace process is to be enhanced and the cycle of violence ended. Above all, the rulers of South Africa must communicate to all who live there that they are serious about ending apartheid. And black leaders must be willing to engage in dialogue about the kind of future they wish to build in South Africa.

What evolves within South Africa must be determined by the people who live in the country. The United States has avoided being prescriptive. But certainly a beginning must be negotiations with the accepted black leaders, and you cannot do that if those leaders are in jail. For this reason we have called on the South African Government to release Nelson Mandela and other long-held political prisoners and to enter into meaningful talks with the genuine leaders of the black community.

U.S. Efforts To Help the Disadvantaged

There are other, more concrete things that the U.S. Government is doing, and will continue to do, to encourage positive change. For example:

- A human rights fund of more than $1 million, administered by the American Embassy in Pretoria, helps support important antiapartheid groups inside South Africa that work for economic, social, legal, and political change. Funds have been used for seminars on human rights, legal aid to detainees and their families, and to pay costs for lawyers challenging apartheid enforcement in the courts.
- The United States currently provides $8 million per year for scholarships for black and other nonwhite South Africans, enabling them to attend both American and South African universities.

• A $1 million program administered through the AFL/CIO [American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations] trains black and other nonwhite labor union leaders in negotiation, organization, and other areas formerly prohibited by apartheid law but now allowed.

• A $2 million program helps black high school students prepare for university entrance exams.

• A $3 million program trains black entrepreneurs to start small businesses and to take advantage of recent changes in apartheid laws that allow nonwhites to open businesses in central business districts.

Other programs aim at helping to develop black leadership as well as to build bridges between whites and nonwhites in South Africa. We are expanding these programs and adding new ones with one goal: to equip blacks and other nonwhite South Africans to play a more effective role—politically and economically—in the postapartheid era.

In this regard, we also invite South Africans to visit our own multiracial society. Each year our International Visitor and Fulbright Programs bring numerous South Africans to visit or study in the United States. New programs will bring black South African journalists to work in U.S. media organizations and black teachers to build skills at U.S. educational institutions.

In South Africa itself, we are considering reopening a consulate in Port Elizabeth to improve our ability to communicate with communities in that increasingly important industrial area. We are now conferring with Congress and with the South African Government on such a step.

What Can American Individuals and Organizations Do?

These are some of the things the U.S. Government is doing. You may well ask what American individuals and organizations can do to help promote an end to apartheid and stimulate reforms within South Africa. Certainly, one area is relevant to Carleton College: black South Africans must overcome tremendous obstacles to receive an education equal to that of whites.

Education is a form of leverage. By offering educational opportunities to black university students, we actively help South Africa educate future leaders. Whether to overcome the effects of apartheid or to qualify for future leadership, they need our help.

For some South African students, this could mean study in the United States at either the undergraduate or postgraduate level. Compared to our efforts in Nigeria, which has roughly three times the population of South Africa and presently has an estimated 20,000 students enrolled in American universities, the number of black South Africans in American institutions is a shocking 450. Whatever happens, South Africa will need educated black citizens trained to assume leadership positions.

For other disadvantaged South Africans, it means assistance to study within South Africa. There is plenty of room for American private organizations to help. Because of the depressed South African rand compared to the dollar, total costs for room, board, and tuition for 1 academic year at a South African university amount to less than $3,500.

I might add that there is considerable movement to enable nonwhite, especially black, South Africans to achieve educational benefits in that country free from constraints of segregation. Recently, nearly all traditionally white universities announced their intention of making an education there available to students regardless of race. In addition, a number of credible private educational institutions have evolved to educate students in the face of the extremely damaging school boycott. Radicals who proclaim, "revolution now, education later," should not discourage Americans from helping students whose education is itself a vehicle for black advancement.

What more significant contribution could Americans make than to make it financially possible for a disadvantaged South African student to receive an education? And what could make us more proud as Americans than joining together in a positive way to make that kind of difference? There are a number of private organizations within South Africa that could select deserving students to receive these educational grants.

American institutions have a long and positive track record in this area. Through the International Institute of Education's South African affiliate, nonwhite South Africans have been directly and indirectly helped to overcome educational deficiencies. Carleton College may wish to open direct contacts with organizations of that kind.

"Hands-on" education is another way to help. Our summer vacation in the United States is South Africa's winter. Schools are in session between May and July. Carleton students could well contribute as tutors, particularly in mathematics and science, where there is a shortage of trained teachers. Or an American institution such as Carleton could help staff an in-service science teacher training program in South Africa.

I believe Americans want to do something positive about South Africa, not contribute to racial tension or economic hardship. That is the American way—to give help, not to do harm; to promote something better, not to make things worse.

This is why your government has tried to keep its eye on the positive goal we all seek and to demonstrate its opposition to apartheid by active involvement to promote change. It's not just a matter of striking a righteous pose. We have some influence; therefore, we have a moral duty to exert it responsibly.

By encouraging South Africans to move toward political dialogue, we seek to build, not to destroy. By using our economic weight in the service of black economic advancement, we provide opportunities and hope for black South Africans.

I invite you to join us in this effort.■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • February 1986
Editor: Cynthia Saboe • This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission; citation of this source is appreciated.



Background Notes

Background Notes are concise, authoritative pamphlets describing about 170 countries and geographic entities of the world, as well as selected international organizations. They contain the most current information on each country's people, culture, geography, history, government, economy, and political conditions. *Background Notes* also include reading list, travel notes, and maps.

Approximately 60 *Background Notes* are updated and published each year. Price: $32.00 per year, domestic; $40.00, foreign.

Department of State Bulletin

This monthly magazine is an indispensable foreign policy reference tool—no library, research center, or world affairs specialist should be without it. The *Bulletin* presents the official record of U.S. foreign policy, including major addresses of the President and the Secretary, statements to the Congress; special features and analytical articles on international affairs by State Department experts; list of treaties and other agreements; and a brief chronology of world events.

Subscription to the *Department of State Bulletin* includes an annual index. Price $25.00 per year, domestic; $31.25, foreign.

Order Form for New Subscriptions

GPO prices are subject to change without notice.
(Confirm by calling 202-783-3238.)

☐ **Background Notes** (BGN)
Annual subscription of approximately 60 *Notes:*
$32.00, domestic; $40.00, foreign

☐ **Department of State Bulletin** (DSB)
Annual subscription of 12 issues plus index: $25.00, domestic; $31.25, foreign

Mail to:
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

Enclosed is $_____ ☐ check or ☐ money order (payable to Superintendent of Documents) or charge to my

Deposit Account No. _____ – _____ Order No. _____

Credit Card Orders Only

Total charges $_____

Credit Card No. _____ Expiration date Month/Year _____

Please Print

Company or personal name

Additional address line

Street address

City _____ State _____ Zip Code _____

(or Country)

For Office Use Only

Quantity _____ Charges

_____ Publications _____
_____ Subscriptions _____
Special shipping charges _____
International handling _____
Special charges _____
OPNR

_____ UPNS
_____ Balance Due
_____ Discount
_____ Refund

June 1984

Bureau of Public Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Official Business

If address is incorrect
please indicate change.
Do not cover or destroy
this address label. Mail
change of address to
PA/OAP, Rm. 5815A

Postage and Fees Paid
Department of State
STA-501